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April 16, 2013
Joanna L. Grossman

Parenthood by Contract: The Kansas Supreme Court Enforces a Lesbian CoParenting
Agreement

How does a person acquire the status of legal parent, with the substantial rights and obligations that come with
the title? The answer to that question has become complicated, as children now enter the world in a variety of
arrangements that may involve more than two adults, reproductive technology, and/or parents of the same sex. A
recurring issue in the law is whether a lesbian coparent—one who functions as a second parent for her partner’s
biological child—can acquire parental or quasiparental rights that allow her to insist on a parentchild
relationship after the adult relationship ends.
In a recent ruling, Frazier v. Goudschaal (http://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supremecourt/2013/103487.html) , the
Kansas Supreme Court held that a lesbian coparent was entitled to full legal parent status on the basis of a co
parenting agreement that she and her partner had signed in conjunction with the birth of each of two daughters.
In this column, I’ll explain the basis for the court’s ruling, as well as the national landscape for lesbian co
parents’ rights.
Frazier v. Goudschaal: One Mother or Two?
Kelly Goudschaal and Marci Frazier jointly decided to have children. Although they had planned to each bear a
child conceived with sperm from the same donor, Frazier was unable to get pregnant. Over the course of two
years, Goudschaal gave birth to two daughters.
With the birth of each child, the two women entered into a coparenting agreement, which established that: (1)
Frazier would be a “de facto parent;” (2) her “relationship with the children should be protected and promoted;”
(3) the parties intended to “jointly and equally share parental responsibility”; (4) the expenses of childrearing
should be borne proportionately relative to income. Moreover, importantly to this case, the agreement stated that
(5) in the event of a separation, “the person who has actual physical custody would take all steps necessary to
maximize the other’s visitation” with the children.
After the two women broke off their relationship, Goudschaal accepted a job in Texas and planned to move there
with both girls within a week. Frazier sued in state court to enforce the coparenting agreement. Goudschaal
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/16/parenthoodbycontract

1/5

11/21/2014

Parenthood by Contract: | Joanna L. Grossman | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

resisted, arguing that her constitutionallyprotected parental rights, embodied in Kansas law through a “parental
preference doctrine,” were such that Frazier could not be recognized as anything other than a legal stranger to the
children. Goudschaal argued that the Kansas Parentage Act cannot be enforced to the extent that it allows
anyone other than the biological mother to be treated as a natural mother.
The Kansas Supreme Court was then asked to decide whether Goudschaal’s parental rights were strong enough to
allow her to exclude Frazier from the children’s lives after the end of the adult relationship, despite the two
women’s having agreed by contract to do the opposite when they were a couple.
Parents and NonParents: A Distinction of Constitutional Importance
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted over the course of nearly a century to
protect parental rights. A legal parent who has not been proven unfit is entitled to the “care, custody, and
control” of her or his child, without undue interference from the state, and without most all forms of interference
from third parties. In exchange for these broad rights, the legal parent has potentially onerous obligations,
including, of course, the duty to support the child financially.
A nonparent has none of these obligations, but also none of these rights. In Troxel v. Granville
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/530/57) (2000), a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that a fit
parent must be presumed to act in the best interests of her child, even when she decides to deny visitation with
grandparents or other third parties who may have a longstanding and loving relationship with the child. Indeed, a
state that wants to allow thirdparty visitation over the objection of a fit parent must, constitutionally, at the very
least, give “special weight” to the parent’s decision to deny visitation and require compelling circumstances to
justify overriding it.
One hard question in lesbian coparent disputes is whether to characterize them as parent (biological mother)
versus nonparent (mother’s partner and child’s functional coparent), or as parent versus parent. Does the intent
to parent plus the actual parenting from birth give the coparent some type of legal status that is either equivalent
to the biological mother’s status, or at least superior to the legal status of other third parties?
Rights for Lesbian CoParents?
Depending on the state, a lesbian coparent may or may not have ways to acquire legal parent status, including
secondparent adoption, a marital presumption of maternity, de facto parentage, or parentage by contract.
In some states, the lesbian coparent is a legal stranger to the child of her partner, regardless of any steps that may
have been taken to establish a parent—child relationship. There are simply no recognized pathways for a child to
have two legal mothers. But in many other states, a lesbian coparent can gain full legal parent status through a
secondparent adoption, provided the biological mother consents to the child’s adoption by the coparent.
In the growing number of states that allow the celebration of samesex marriages or civil unions, a lesbian co
parent can sometimes gain legal parent status by virtue of being married to a child’s biological mother. She is, at
least presumptively, the legal parent of children born to her spouse or civil union partner—in the same way that a
husband is often considered to be the legal father of children born to his wife during their marriage, regardless of
whether he possesses or lacks a genetic tie to them.
Whether or not a state allows secondparent adoption by a samesex coparent, it may recognize the doctrine of
de facto parentage, through which a coparent gains quasiparental rights because she has functioned as a parent
in a relationship that was actively facilitated by the biological mother. This doctrine has been expressly adopted
in a handful of states and expressly rejected in a handful of others (including New York, as I have written about
in a previous column (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100511.html) ). Where recognized, this doctrine
requires a court to make a factintensive decision about the nature of the coparent’s relationship with the child
and whether that relationship can be preserved over the objection of the biological mother.
This doctrine also differs from state to state, not only as to which factors are necessarily to establish de facto
parentage, but also as to the rights that arise from it. Most states allow the de facto parent to petition for
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/16/parenthoodbycontract
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visitation, but not for sole or shared custody. A few states, however, treat the de facto parent as having legal
rights on par with those of the biological mother.
Finally, a small number of states—now, including Kansas—have given rights to lesbian coparents by enforcing
coparenting agreements.
Parental Rights by Agreement: A New Trend?
Before the ruling in Frazier, the highest courts in North Carolina and Ohio had issued opinions in which they
denied more traditional bases for a lesbian coparent’s parental status, but allowed for the possibility of joint
custody by virtue of an agreement with the biological mother.
In 2009, in Boseman v. Jarrell (http://law.justia.com/cases/northcarolina/courtofappeals/2009/0809571.html) , the
North Carolina Supreme Court overturned a secondparent adoption, ruling that state law did not permit such
adoptions (despite the fact that trial courts had been routinely granting them). The Boseman court held that the
coparent was not a legal parent, and yet was entitled to seek joint custody because the biological mother had
acted inconsistently with her legally endowed “paramount status” visàvis the child. This was not, in other
words, a typical parentversusnonparent dispute (in which the parent typically wins). There was only one legal
parent, but the court held nonetheless that there were two women who were entitled to share custody of the child
in question.
In a case with similar facts, In re Mullen (http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supremecourtofohio/2011/2011ohio
3361.html) , the Ohio Supreme Court ruled against the lesbian coparent. But in doing so, it made clear that it
would have been willing to enforce a coparenting agreement. The problem, in this case, was that the coparent
had insufficient proof that the biological mother had voluntarily agreed to share custody with a nonparent.
There were limits to the court’s willingness to recognize parental rights granted by contract. The court made
clear that a legal parent cannot confer legal parent status on a third party such as a lesbian coparent, but he or she
can confer custodial rights by virtue of an enforceable sharedcustody agreement. The court held that a “parent
may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of his or her child through a valid shared
parenting agreement,” the essence of which “is the purposeful relinquishment of some portion of the parent’s
right to exclusive custody of the child.” Such an agreement, the court explained, “recognizes the general
principle that a parent can grant custody rights to a nonparent and will be bound by the agreement.”
Under the Ohio court’s ruling, a valid sharedparenting agreement is enforceable as long as (1) the coparent is a
“proper person to assume the care, training, and education of the child,” and (2) the agreement serves the child’s
best interests. This second requirement makes clear the differences between custodial rights and parental rights:
Fit parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interests, but their status does not depend on their actually
doing so, decision by decision. Parents do not gain or lose their status based upon whether their presence in a
child’s life serves the child’s best interests.
Despite the Ohio court’s willingness to recognize custodial rights for a samesex coparent, the partner in this
case did not prevail. She did not, in the court’s view, present sufficient evidence of a shared parenting
agreement. Although Mullen had granted Hobbs some rights and responsibilities relating to parenting through
various legal documents, those rights, the court found, were both revocable and revoked. And there was
evidence to suggest that Mullen had “consistently refused to enter into or sign any formal sharedcustody
agreement when presented with the opportunity to do so.” For future cases, the court cautioned that “the best
way to safeguard both a parent’s and a nonparent’s rights with respect to children is to agree in writing as to how
custody is to be shared, the manner in which it is shared, and the degree to which it may be revocable or
permanent. . . .”
Thus, the coparent had no rights as a parent, and insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the
biological mother was acting in her child’s best interests by unilaterally severing ties between her former partner
and her child. Mullen was a sad case, which perhaps reached the wrong outcome on the facts. The biological
mother clearly intended, at least initially, to allow her partner to share in childrearing. As one judge wrote in
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/04/16/parenthoodbycontract

3/5

11/21/2014

Parenthood by Contract: | Joanna L. Grossman | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

dissent, “Is filial love something to be dangled and then snatched away, promised and then reneged upon? Once a
natural parent promises a coparenting relationship with another person and acts on that promise, she has created
a relationship between the coparent and the child that has its own life. The natural parent cannot simply declare
that relationship over.” The judge found the doctrine, which allows such unilateral exclusion of a social parent,”
to be “not only harmful to the coparent and the child,” but an offense against “common decency.”
The Kansas Case: A Broad Ruling in Favor of CoParenting Agreements
In its ruling in Frazier v. Goudschaal, discussed at the beginning of this column, the Kansas Supreme Court
upheld the trial court’s award of rights to Frazier, the coparent. The court first settled a dispute about standing—
that is, the right to go to court—and then concluded that, under the Kansas Parentage Act, a woman “can make a
colorable claim to being a presumptive mother of a child without claiming to be the biological or adoptive
mother” and therefore can claim standing to establish the existence of a motherandchild relationship.
The Kansas Supreme Court then moved to the heart of the matter—whether Goudschaal could sever ties between
Frazier and the two children unilaterally, or whether she was bound to share custody and parenting time based on
the coparenting agreement. The court ruled that the agreement could be enforced. Although Goudschaal’s
rights were initially paramount—which was the legal privilege of being the biological mother—she had exercised
her “parental preference” (the doctrinal name Kansas gives to these protected rights) by entering into a co
parenting agreement with her partner. Parental preference can be waived, the court reasoned, and “courts should
not be required to assign to a mother any more rights than that mother has claimed for herself.”
The right to exclude protected by Troxel and other rulings also covers the right to include. “If,” the court
explained, “a parent has a constitutional right to make the decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of
his or her children, free of government interference, then that parent should have the right to enter into a co
parenting agreement to share custody with another without having the government interfere by nullifying that
agreement, so long as it is in the best interests of the children.”
As a policy matter, it was important to Kansas’ high court that denying enforcement to the coparenting
agreement would consign the children to having only one parent, which many other statutes and precedents
counsel against. Enforcement, the court explained, means that children of a lesbian couple can be treated on par
with children of a traditional heterosexual marriage, as well as on par with children of oppositesex, unwed
parents who gained the right to the recognition of two parents through a series of federal constitutional cases
about illegitimacy and unwed fatherhood in the 1970s.
Having concluded that the coparenting agreement was enforceable, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
district court’s power to issue orders relating to custody, parenting time (visitation), and child support.
This ruling is even broader than the ones in Ohio or North Carolina. The court not only allows for an award of
shared custody to Frazier, but also speaks of her as a second parent, and orders her to pay child support (which
she was not contesting). It does suggest that the agreement must serve the children’s best interests, which is more
consistent with a grant of quasiparent rather than parent status. But, still, one might conclude that the rights and
obligations Frazier earns through this ruling are tantamount to legal parentage.
Conclusion
The Kansas Supreme Court expressly concludes by embracing a proposition that courts in many other contexts
have only danced around—the proposition that a parent’s constitutionally protected right to be in charge can be
diluted or shared by consent. All mechanisms through which a coparent might gain legal protection revolve
around the consent of the primary parent. Secondparent adoption cannot proceed without the primary parent’s
joining the petition. Marriage or civil union does not occur without both parties’ consent (although whether
consent to marry should be synonymous with consent to share parental rights is a question worthy of separate
consideration). De facto parentage, as the doctrine is spelled out in most cases, cannot occur without the primary
parent’s active creation and fostering of the relationship between coparent and child. It is only natural, then, for
courts to give effect to coparenting agreements, particularly those that are memorialized in writing, in which the
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primary parent makes clear her intent and willingness to share parental responsibilities and rights with another
adult.
One interesting question opened by this ruling is this: What will happen to William Marotta? The subject of
many news articles in the past few months, Marotta is a Kansas man who answered an ad placed by two lesbian
women on Craigslist who were seeking sperm. Marotta provided the sperm, with which one of the women was
inseminated, and the three adults signed a written agreement making clear that Marotta had relinquished any and
all parental rights to children that might be produced by the use of his sperm. The agreement also specified that
the two women would share parental rights and duties.
A child was produced, the two women broke up, and the biological mother eventually sought welfare assistance
from the state. As part of standard procedure, the State of Kansas insisted that she reveal the identity of the
biological father of her child, and has gone after him for child support. Although sperm donors are generally
protected by nonpaternity laws, the applicable Kansas law only protects donors when the insemination is done
by a physician. In this case, the insemination was, instead, done by the two women at home.
The coparent in this case has filed a claim for recognition of her parental or quasiparental status, for which the
ruling in Frazier v. Goudschaal provides powerful new support. But does the ruling also mean that a co
parenting agreement can be enforced when it relinquishes parental rights (the Marotta case) or only when it
grants them? Some Kansas court is going to face the tough decision whether to enforce Marotta’s agreement as a
matter of consistency with Frazier, or whether to insist that Marotta is the legal father because of the
circumstances of the insemination. If the latter path is taken, then the child at issue potentially will have three
legal parents, an outcome that has been rejected by virtually every court in the United States to consider it.
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